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1. Introduction 
 
Europe’s broadband regulatory framework has been inspired by the concept of access 
regulation to the bottleneck elements of vertically integrated providers of infrastructure 
services. Hence, competitive access is seen as the instrument for eliminating the deadweight 
loss of monopoly and for establishing efficient service provision. To favour competitive 
entry, cost-based access pricing regimes have been adopted in most countries. The rationale 
behind this framework is that local loop access products will allow entrants to provide 
services with minimum direct investment while relying on the existing network developed 
by incumbents. Entrants are subsequently expected to invest, and to an increasing degree, in 
their own infrastructure. 
 
The predicted results of such policies are twofold. On the one hand, new firms (entrants) can 
be expected to operate increasingly within more markets, while older firms holding 
monopolistic power (incumbents) are expected to expand their operations beyond their 
borders. Thus, telecommunications firms should increase the extent of their 
internationalization and their market knowledge. On the other hand, it is also expected that 
over time entrants will not require elements of the incumbent network and, therefore, will be 
able to compete by exploiting their own infrastructure. Both predictions have implications 
for the firms’ investment decisions (i.e., broadband deployment) and, as such, for aggregate 
investment at the country level in the telecommunications sector. Within this framework, we 
analyse the effects of access regulation and different firm typologies (defined by the extent 
of their internationalization and market knowledge) in order to determine actual 
infrastructure investment behaviour in the European broadband market. 
 
Previous studies identify different patterns of investment behaviour in such markets 
depending on whether firms are market incumbents or entrants (Wallsten and Hausladen, 
2009 and Grajek and Roller, 2010). However, these authors (and all others, to the best of our 
knowledge) fail to account for all possible firm types participating in the market. Thus, in 
addition to classifying firms as incumbents or entrants, an incumbent firm in one country 
may also be an entrant in another, while an entrant may operate in several countries. 
Likewise, different investment behaviours can also be expected from this wider taxonomy of 
firms that also takes into account the extent of their international and knowledge dimensions.  
 
On the one hand, the extent of a firm’s internationalization, i.e., its international participation 
through investment in assets and/or control of activities in several markets, will afford 
certain advantages given, among others, the possibilities to exploit economies of scale and 
scope, to have enhanced power in standard-setting debates (of obvious relevance in a hi-tech 
industry such as telecommunications), and to increase long-term market capitalization, 
which favours the investment required by infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications. 
 
On the other hand, a firm’s market knowledge is a further dimension that needs to be 
considered alongside its internationalization. First, increasing internationalization implies 
that a firm can accumulate knowledge by operating in more than one country. Thus, overall 
market expansion can benefit from the knowledge acquired in other countries. Second, as 
well as reaping the benefits of internationalization, incumbents have a better knowledge of 
the market than that held by entrants. Given that incumbents are former monopolist 
operators, they will have accumulated years of experience and knowledge about customers, 
regulations and doing business in the local market. By considering these two characteristics 
of telecommunications firms (i.e., their internationalization and market knowledge), we 
  
propose constructing a new typology of firms and examining its impact on broadband 
investment.  
 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 undertakes a review of the literature related to 
access regulation, internationalization and market knowledge. Section 3 outlines our 
empirical strategy and discusses data issues. Section 4 presents the estimations and results of 
our analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Drivers of Investment in Telecommunications: a Review of the Literature  
 
In Europe, high-speed broadband Internet access is provided by two main technologies: DSL 
(Digital Subscriber Line) and cable. Although other access technologies are available 
(FTTH, WLL, Satellite and PLC), by July 2009, DSL and cable represented around 80 and 
15% of broadband retail lines, respectively.
1
 While the cable industry is not subject to access 
regulation in Europe,
2
 its DSL markets are subject to a form of third-party access regulation, 
known as mandatory unbundling. Therefore, as it is the dominant technology in Europe’s 
retail broadband market and because changes to the DSL regulatory framework have sought 
to promote broadband deployment through competition (EU Directive 2002/19/EC), DSL 
forms the focus of this study. Below, we review the economic literature dealing with the 
impact of access regulation and the impact of firms’ internationalization and market 
knowledge on broadband investment. 
 
2.1 Access Regulation 
 
During 2002, unbundling regulation was implemented in Europe in order to ensure the 
entrance of new agents in the sector.
3
 With the aim of stimulating competition and achieving 
the desired effects in markets and among consumers, new entrants were provided with access 
to the incumbents’ fixed-line infrastructure at the wholesale level. This new mandatory 
framework was set out in several EU Directives obliging Member States to introduce the 
measures within their national laws in a pre-determined period of time (albeit that various 
distinctions were made between countries). Thus, each Member State has taken steps 
towards implementing the new regulations with respect to each access type in accordance 
with the specific characteristics of their local markets.  
 
The effects of mandatory unbundling in Europe have generated considerable debate. Its 
proponents claim that unbundling serves to encourage broadband deployment and to 
promote facility-based competition, while its opponents argue that it distorts entrants’ make-
or-buy decisions, impedes investment incentives and, as such, has been a failure.
4
 A leading 
question in this debate concerns the effects of mandatory unbundling on a firm’s investment 
incentives. Given that this is the focus of our research, the following summary of the 
literature examines the findings of relevant studies.  
 
The theoretical literature, conducted from a variety of approaches and examining the impact 
of access regulation on investment, does not provide policy makers with any clear-cut 
answers (Valletti, 2003). Most of the theoretical models presented therein assume 
exogenously determined positions for both incumbents and entrants in the market. As such, 
                                                 
1 
Estimation based on EC report (2009). 
2 
In 2009, for the first time, access obligations were imposed on a cable network in Denmark (see EC, 2009).
 
3 
 Regulatory framework provided for under EU Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, and 2002/21/EC. 
4
 The literature review on broadband and investment regulation in Cambini and Jiang (2009) provides extensive 
coverage of this debate. 
  
access regulation is viewed as a pro-competitive measure and an instrument for spurring 
investment. This reasoning underpins the “stepping stone” or “ladder of investment” theory 
proposed by Cave and Vogelsang (2003). This theory holds that allowing entrants to lease 
elements of the incumbents’ network with minimum direct investment at initial stages of 
competition acts as a catalyst for them to invest and create their own infrastructure. Based on 
analyses of these two firm types, such models analyse the impact of access regulation on 
investment (see, for example, De Bijl and Peitz, 2005, and Vareda, 2007).  
 
Alternatively, some models rely on an endogenous determination of a firm’s position, 
reflecting its own actions and those of other firms. Firms compete with each other to 
determine their positions and, hence, infrastructure investment decisions are affected by 
access regulation. Examples of studies conducted from this approach include Gans and 
Williams (1999), Gans (2001) and Hori and Mizuno (2009). Gans and Williams (1999) show 
that an appropriately specified access price can result in socially optimal investment timing 
and one that, in all circumstances, is superior to a scenario without regulation. Gans (2001) 
confirms these results with the introduction of downstream competition. By contrast, Hori 
and Mizuno (2009), in examining the choice between service-based and facility-based 
competition, find that the former leads to delays in the construction of alternative 
infrastructure when entrants access the incumbent network. 
 
Given this lack of consensus in the theoretical findings concerning the impact of access 
regulation on broadband investment, many empirical studies have sought to provide 
improved insights for policy implementation. The empirical literature examining this issue 
can, however, be divided in two strands: studies finding evidence in support of mandatory 
unbundling and studies that point in the opposite direction.  
 
Based on an industry simulation
5
 on United Kingdom data, Christodoulou and Vlahous 
(2001) suggest that a mix of infrastructure and service competition, such as that promoted in 
the Netherlands,
6
 stimulates incumbent and entrant investment alike and offers better 
consumer benefits. The implication of these results for policy makers is that the introduction 
of “sunset clauses” provides new entrants with strong incentives to invest while allowing 
them to enter in service competition and acquire essential knowledge about their new 
market. 
 
The OECD Report (2001) claims that, for its member states, “the evidence indicates that 
opening access networks, and network elements, to competitive forces increases investment 
and the pace of development”. Likewise, Wallsten (2007) tests the impact of regulation and 
demographic variables on broadband development in OECD countries for the period 1999-
2003, explicitly taking into account different types of unbundling regulations. The author 
finds that extensive unbundling mandates and certain types of price regulation can reduce 
broadband investment incentives, although regulations ensuring easier interconnection with 
the incumbent can increase investment. 
 
                                                 
5
 Industry simulation involves business strategy models at the firm level and, rather than seeking equilibrium 
solutions, offers insights to possible outcomes of strategic choices that companies might make. 
6
 The Dutch regulator, OPTA, proposed an approach that includes the introduction of “sunset clauses”. This 
meant the gradual introduction of a five-year transition period from tariffs based on historical costs to tariffs 
based on current costs in an attempt at stimulating competition in both the early stages and in later years. After 
the five-year period, the incumbent would, in principle, be free to set its tariffs on a commercial basis 
(Christodoulou and Vlahous, 2001). 
  
Yet, the weight of empirical findings tends to lend greater support to the detractors of 
mandatory unbundling. Despite the fact that a large number of these studies draw on data for 
the United States, below we restrict our summary to the main findings within Europe, given 
that this is the framework in which we conduct our study.
7
 
 
By comparing the diffusion of broadband access through intra-platform and service-based 
competition, Distaso et al. (2006) analyse the effects of mandatory unbundling on broadband 
deployment. Using data for 14 European countries for the period 2000-2004, they find inter-
platform competition to be the main driver of broadband uptake, while competition in the 
market for DSL services does not play a significant role. 
 
Hoffler (2007) studies the costs and benefits from infrastructure competition by estimating 
the welfare effects of broadband access competition between DSL and cable. The study 
draws on data for 16 Western European countries between 2000 and 2004. The author finds 
that infrastructure competition had a significant and positive impact on broadband 
penetration. However, when comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable 
competition with that derived from cable investment, he concludes that, in the absence of 
significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has not been welfare enhancing.  
 
Friederiszick et al. (2008) analyse the relationship between entry regulation and 
infrastructure investment, drawing on data for 27 European countries between 1997 and 
2006. Paying careful attention to the endogeneity problem of regulation (by applying 
instrumental variables), the authors report that entry regulation discourages infrastructure 
investment by entrants and that it has no effect on incumbent firms in the fixed-line 
telecommunication sector.
8
 
 
Distaso et al. (2006) and Hoffler (2007) made early contributions to the debate on the effects 
of mandatory unbundling on broadband penetration. However, both studies only examine the 
two-year period immediately following the implementation of the new regulation. A longer 
period of time, such as the one adopted in our estimations, is needed to obtain a better 
appreciation of the consequences of unbundling on broadband uptake.  
 
In short, empirical studies conducted in Europe provide conflicting evidence on the  impact 
of access regulation on broadband investment and as such the debate remains ongoing. 
 
2.2 Internationalization and Market Knowledge 
 
Various studies point to different patterns of investment behaviour in broadband markets 
depending on the typology of operating firms, but to date this typological classification has 
been limited to that of market incumbents and entrants. Here, in addition, we propose 
classifying firms by their degree of internationalization and the extent of their market 
knowledge. We then seek to determine whether (and how) this new firm typology affects 
infrastructure investment decisions in the European broadband market.  
 
Different patterns of behaviour expressed by incumbents and entrants have been described 
by Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) through the estimation of separate regressions for the two 
                                                 
7
 Studies taking this line outside Europe include Jorde et al. (2000), Crandall and Singer (2003), Ingraham and 
Sidak (2003), Zarakas et al. (2005) and Jung et al. (2008); while examples of studies countering the ladder of 
investment theory in the US are Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004) and Hazlett and Bazelon (2005).  
8
 The authors focus primarily on telecommunication operators given, they argue, that cable has low rates of 
penetration in Europe.  
  
firm types. Using a data set for 27 European countries over the period 2002 – 2007, they find 
a significant negative correlation between the number of unbundled DSL connections per 
capita and the number of fibre connections. They also confirm the negative impact of 
unbundling policies on new infrastructure investment (measured by the number of new fibre 
lines). Similarly, Grajek and Roller (2010), in a study of 20 European countries over the 
period 1997-2006, in which they examine just fixed-line operators, find that an increase in 
regulatory intensity decreases incumbents’ investment but increases total investment across 
entrants. However, these results are based on the impact of access regulation on total 
investment summed over entrants, so when they focus solely on individual entrants they find 
that access regulation has a negative impact on their investment.  
 
In line with these previous studies, we also consider differences between incumbents and 
entrants. However, additionally, the firm classification proposed here considers the 
possibility that the extent of a firm’s internationalization and market knowledge may also 
affect its investment decisions. In general, to understand the motivations underpinning a 
firm’s internationalization and its investment decisions we rely on arguments drawn from 
International Business Theory and Management Theory.  
 
The eclectic paradigm of international production (Dunning, 1977, and Dunning and 
Lundan, 2007) is part of the International Business Theory 
9
 with a three-component 
structure: ownership, location, and internalization. The ownership component explains how 
companies manage to obtain sustainable competitive advantage, analyzing their internal 
resources to correct their weaknesses and develop their potentials. The existence of assets is 
related to a firm’s capacity to expand and stand out from its competitors. Among its tangible 
assets are economies of scale and patents, while its intangible assets include the firm’s 
brands and reputation. The assets might, furthermore, be specific to a particular location (the 
location component) in terms of their origin and use, yet at the same time be available to all 
firms. These assets also include, therefore, the cultural, legal, political, financial and 
institutional environment in which they are deployed. Finally, the internalization component, 
with obvious links to Coase’s (1960) transaction costs and Williamson’s (1967) notion of a 
firm’s boundaries, reflects that these boundaries should be kept as large as possible while it 
faces transaction costs. Therefore, from the resource base and transaction costs at the root of 
the ownership and internalization components, by expanding internationally a firm may 
obtain certain cost reductions and/or exploit its scale economies.  
 
From another perspective, the strategic management literature views the internationalization 
as a form of diversification.
10
 As for firm’s product diversification, firms invest 
internationally for several motives. Nachum and Zaheer (2005) labelled these motives as 
market seeking, efficiency seeking, resource seeking, export seeking, and knowledge 
seeking, each of which value different resource endowments in the host country. Thus, 
among others, firms may emphasize the potential for economies of scale in choosing target 
countries for internationalization. Essentially this is a decision by firms on how best to 
configure its activities internally, in line with the comparative advantage of different 
locations in order to maximize efficiency and reduce costs. 
 
                                                 
9
 Other international business theories include the Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977 and 2009) and 
the internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 2003 and 2009).  
10
 Even thought studies uses different labels as international diversification, international expansion, geographic 
diversification, globalization and multinationality all tend to refer to the same conduct; what we call the firms 
internationalization.  
  
Firms may invest internationally in an efficiency-seeking process (see Dunning and Lundan, 
2007 and Nachum and Zaheer, 2005) and, hence, a positive relation can be expected between 
the degree of their internationalization and their investment in the host country. However, 
from a different perspective, it might be argued that as a part of this internationalization a 
firm’s multi-market contacts can lead to collusive behaviour and, hence, deter a firm from 
investing (Bernhein and Whinston, 1990).  
 
Additional insights are provided by Sarkar et al. (1999), who combine elements of 
International Business Theory and management theory to study the drivers of the 
internationalization of telecommunication service providers. The authors highlight that the 
role played by scale as an internationalization driver includes the enhanced negotiating 
power it affords over equipment suppliers, cost reductions through volume accumulations 
across country locations and market segments, an increase in long-term market 
capitalization, and the economies derived from the optimization of network design. 
 
Within the context of internationalization, knowledge also plays an important role. Ghoshal 
(1987) claims that internationalization can promote the experience or internal learning 
capabilities of companies helping them innovate and meet future changes. The learning 
effect of internationalization comes from the higher volume of operations, which allows 
firms to accumulate knowledge while progressively reducing costs.  
 
In addition to this international component, a firm’s knowledge of a specific market is 
closely related to its original position in that market. Depending on whether the firm is an 
incumbent or entrant, its market knowledge will differ. Incumbents have a better knowledge 
of the local market than is the case of entrants, as the former have years of experience and 
valuable accumulated knowledge of that market (customers, regulations, doing business, 
etc.). This is especially true in markets that once were monopolies but which have been 
liberalized, such as the telecommunications market and the new markets that have emerged 
from it, such as the broadband market. 
 
While it is true that incumbents have a better knowledge of the local market than is the case 
with entrants, it is also true that the global knowledge of some entrants may be as well very 
important, at least compared with other entrants. First, following the internationalization of 
knowledge argument, entrants (incumbents) can be expected to present different investment 
behaviour depending on the degree of their internationalization (i.e. the number of countries 
in which they operate). Second, the overall knowledge of an entrant (incumbent) can differ 
depending on its position in the international markets (whether it is an incumbent or an 
entrant in other countries).  
 
The role of internationalization and market knowledge as drivers of investment can be 
summarized as follows. First, since firms may invest internationally in an efficiency-seeking 
process and exploit their scale economies, a positive relation is to be expected between the 
degree of internationalization of a firm and its investment in the host country. Second, 
incumbents and entrants have different levels of knowledge of the local market and this may 
result in different investment behaviours. And, third, it can also be expected different 
behaviour within the entrants and within the incumbents depending on their degree of 
internationalization and their respective positions in the international markets. 
 
 
 
 
  
3. Empirical Strategy and Data Issues 
 
In this section we present the empirical strategy and the data used in testing empirically the 
relevance of the investment drivers discussed in the previous section. Eq. (1) represents 
country i infrastructure investment at time t (Invit) as a function of the typology of firms 
(TFit), the regulation (Regit-1) and our three control variables: inter-facility competition 
(HHI_interit), intra-facility competition (HHI_intrait) and per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDPpcit). 
 
ittiitit4it31it2it1it εGDPpcαHHI_intraαHHI_interαRegαTFαInv   5     (1) 
 
We combine data from various sources to create an original panel data set for testing the 
drivers of investment in broadband for the 27 European countries over the period 2002-2009 
(see Table 1 for the definitions and sources of the variables). Below we explain the variables 
used in Eq. (1).  
 
Table 1: Definitions and data sources 
 
Infrastructure investment 
 
Due to the lack of firm level data regarding specific investment in broadband infrastructure, 
we use a country level approach in which investment is approximated by the change in the 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent   
Invit 
Investment measured as the change in 
infrastructure stock (penetration rate) 
European Commission  
 Inv_incit  Investment by incumbent 
Inv_entit Investment by entrant 
Typology of firm  
Point Topic, NRAs and firms’ annual reports 
 
TF_Linit  Linear  
TF_Convit Convex  
TF_Concit Concave 
itLinTFInc _  Incumbent linear 
itConTFInc _  Incumbent concave 
itLinTFEnt _  Entrant linear 
itConTFEnt _  Entrant concave 
Regulation 
1itAR  
1itTrans  
 
1itRegQ   
 
Access Regulation Intensity (0-3) 
 
Transposition of Community Law in 
Information Society 
 
Regulatory Quality Index 
 
Plaut Economic and NRAs 
 
European Commission Application of EU Law 
 
 
World Bank  
Competition 
itHHI_inter  
itHHI_intra  
 
Herfindahl Inter-facility Index 
Herfindahl Intra-facility Index 
Point Topic   
Income 
itGDPpc  
Per capita GDP (thousands €, 2000  
prices) 
Eurostat 
  
stock of infrastructure. More precisely, following Roller and Waverman (2001) and 
Koutroumpis (2009), from a broadband infrastructure production function we construct our 
broadband infrastructure investment variable as shown in Eq. (2): 
 







1it
it
it
Pen
Pen
LnInv ,     (2) 
 
where Penit (the DSL penetration rate, number of lines per capita) represents the stock of 
broadband infrastructure in country i at time t. Data on the number of lines by country are 
drawn from two reports on broadband access published by the European Commission, 
namely the Communication Committee’s Working Documents on “Broadband access in the 
EU: situation at July 2007” and “Broadband access in the EU: situation at July 2009”. These 
reports have been published twice a year since the implementation of mandatory unbundling 
in 2002. Data on population comes from Eurostat. 
 
Typology of Firms 
 
As outlined above, the extent of a firm’s internationalization and knowledge (as an 
incumbent or entrant) will influence its investment decisions across countries and time. We 
expect that the higher the degree of internationalization and knowledge a firm possesses, the 
greater will be its level of investment in that country.  
 
Given that our firm typology is in part based on the degree of internationalization, it is 
essential to know how it might be measured. Dörrenbacher (2000) proposes three categories 
of indicator of internationalization: structural, performance and attitudinal. Structural 
indicators are those that provide a picture of a firm’s international network at a given point 
in time. Two examples of such an indicator would be, first, the number of countries in which 
the firm is present and, second, its foreign assets expressed as a percentage of its total assets. 
Performance indicators measure the success or failure of a firm’s activities abroad measured 
in terms of turnover and operating income. Attitudinal indicators focus on how the firm 
views and treats its subsidiaries abroad. One such measure is the amount of international 
experience (in terms of the number of years living abroad) that senior managers have.  
 
Although the literature offers many methods for measuring internationalization, some are 
obviously easier to apply than others. Specifically, the availability of data is a major 
influence on which of the measures are feasible and which are not; for this reason, in this 
study we use a variant of the structural indicator, namely the number of countries in which 
the firm is present.  
 
We construct a country level measure of firm typology based on the extent of a firm’s 
knowledge and internationalization. Firms have associated an internationalization-
knowledge valuation (Vitf) for each country and period. In associating this valuation with 
each firm, the firms need to be sorted; first, in terms of the extent of their market knowledge 
of country i (whether they are incumbents or entrants); second, by the degree of their 
internationalization (the number of countries they operate in besides country i); and, third, 
according to their role as incumbents of, or entrants in, those countries.  
 
Finally, the valuation (Vitf) obtained by firms (f) operating in country (i) is added for each 
period (t) to obtain the typology (TFit) characterizing the firms in that country and period. 
 
  



n
f
itfit VTF
1
  f = firms {1…n}   (3) 
 
As we have no prior information informing us as to how the different valuations might relate 
to each other, we construct three typologies of firms based on different relations between the 
scores of the valuation: linear, convex, and concave.  
 
As shown in Table 2, the highest valuations are assigned to the more experienced and 
internationalized firms; the lower valuations are assigned to firms that are market entrants in 
just one country. This valuation increases if the entrant operates in more than one country, 
the extent of the increase depending on its position there: the increase is only slight if the 
firm is an entrant, while the increase is more marked if it is an incumbent. This allows us to 
capture not only the distinct behaviour that is to be expected between entrants according to 
the extent of their internationalization, but also that according to their overall knowledge 
gained from their position in the international markets (as entrants or incumbents). The 
valuation of the incumbents is assigned analogously. The lowest valuation is assigned to an 
incumbent that operates in just one country, while the highest is assigned to an incumbent 
that is also incumbent in two or more countries and an entrant of another.
11
 
 
Table 2: Valuation of Firms’ Internationalization and Market Knowledge 
  Valuation 
Internationalization and Market Knowledge Linear 
Cov 
X^2 
Con 
X^.5 
Entrant in country i 0.0500 0.0025 0.2236 
Entrant in country i and one other country  0.1000 0.0100 0.3162 
Entrant in country i and two other countries 0.1500 0.0225 0.3873 
Entrant in country i and incumbent in another country 0.2000 0.0400 0.4472 
Entrant in country i and in another country and incumbent in another country 0.2500 0.0625 0.5000 
Entrant in country i and incumbent in two other countries 0.3000 0.0900 0.5477 
Entrant in country i and in another country and incumbent in two other countries  0.3500 0.1225 0.5916 
Entrant in country i and incumbent in more than two other countries 0.4000 0.1600 0.6325 
Incumbent in country i 0.4500 0.2025 0.6708 
Incumbent in country i and entrant in another country 0.5000 0.2500 0.7071 
Incumbent in country i and entrant in two other countries 0.5500 0.3025 0.7416 
Incumbent in country i and in another country 0.6000 0.3600 0.7746 
Incumbent in country i and in another country and entrant in another country 0.6500 0.4225 0.8062 
Incumbent in country i and in another country and entrant in two other countries 0.7000 0.4900 0.8367 
Incumbent in country i and in more than two other countries 0.7500 0.5625 0.8660 
Incumbent in country i and in more than two other countries and entrant in another country 0.8000 0.6400 0.8944 
 
We use TFit in the first group of estimations as an initial (aggregate) approximation of the 
impact of firm type on investment. In the second group of estimations, we separate each 
country’s firms according to whether they are incumbents or entrants so as to take into 
account that the two behave differently because their knowledge of the local market differs. 
In other words, we estimate the following infrastructure investment equations for incumbent 
and entrant firms:  
                                                 
11
 All the typologies represented here are based on the casuistic derived from the observation of firms in the 
European DSL broadband market. Thus, feasible typologies that do not occur in the periods and countries 
examined in this study were not included. Data for the construction of this variable come from the information 
provided by Point Topic’s Global Broadband Statistics, National Regulatory Agency reports and the annual 
reports of telecommunication companies. 
  
 
ittiitit4it31it2it1it εGDPpcαHHI_intraαHHI_interαRegαIncTFαIncInv   5__ (4) 
 
ittiitit4it31it2it1it εGDPpcαHHI_intraαHHI_interαRegαEntTFαEntInv   5__ (5) 
 
As presented in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we differentiate between incumbents (TF_Incit) and 
entrants (TF_Entit) so as to analyse the impact of typology on each equation of investment 
behaviour. The valuation assignment within incumbents and within entrants, however, is 
maintained as in the general firm typology.
12
 Hence, we focus on the effect that the degree of 
internationalization of a firm has on its investment decisions, but also on its overall 
knowledge gained from the positions it holds in internationals markets.
13
 
 
Regulation 
 
The relevance of regulation as a driver of broadband investment was reflected in the 
literature review. Normally, a firm’s investment decisions are taken in line with strategic 
investment plans, within which annual investment levels for the forthcoming year are 
decided at the end of that current year (if there is no information regarding future changes in 
regulation). Thus, regulations that can affect investment decisions for the forthcoming year 
are those that come into effect at the end of the current year. In order to capture the fact that 
firms do not react immediately to regulation, in Eq. (1) we introduce the various regulatory 
variables lagged one period.
14
 
 
Several studies of the European telecommunications markets use the Plaut Economic 
regulation index (either all or just some of its components) as a regulation indicator. Here, 
we also use it as our access regulation intensity variable. However, since we do not want our 
results to be dependent on a single regulation indicator, we perform our estimations using 
three different indicators: Access Regulation Intensity (ARit-1), Transposition of Community 
Law in Information Society (Transit-1), and Regulatory Quality (RegQit-1). Below, we 
provide further details of these regulatory variables. 
 
Access Regulation Intensity (ARit-1) 
 
In an unbundled DSL network, market competitors can provide customers with broadband 
access using different means. These means are related to the unbundled network elements 
                                                 
12
 To allow comparisons between the results obtained for the incumbents and entrants, incumbent valuations 
were normalized (rescaled so as to have the same minimum value as the entrants). Thus, the ratings assigned to 
both, incumbents and entrants, are in the same range. 
13
 When a firm from one country decides to enter into another country, it could also take into account the 
institutional framework similarity between the origin and destiny countries (its market knowledge might be 
more useful in a country similar to its own). We could account for this fact by including two different variables 
separately (type of firm and institutional similarity) or by including one variable that is a weighted indicator of 
the typology of firm taking into account the institutional similarity. However in a country level analysis as we 
do, some cautions should be taken regarding the analysis of institutional similarity across countries. On one 
side, the variable capturing the existence of a similar institutional framework can be fixed over time or specific 
to a group of countries and, hence, be captured in the fixed effect variables. On the other side, the weighted 
index of typology of firm taking into account the institutional similarity aggregated a country level can distort 
the effect we are trying to observe with the variable type of firm, not being totally clear what is the effect 
captured by the estimated parameters. 
14
 The introduction of the regulatory variables lagged one period also allows us to avoid the possible 
endogeneity problems mentioned above.  
  
(UNEs) and represent the different types of access that the entrants have to the incumbent 
network. 
 
The access regulation intensity variable is compound by the regulation of each access type 
(full ULL, shared and bitstream). For each type of access, the variable represents whether 
access regulation exists or not. Therefore, it takes the value of 1 when it exists and 0 
otherwise. The access regulation intensity variable in a country i during period t is the sum 
of the access regulations to the three access types. Hence, it takes discrete values between 0 
and 3: 
 
1111   itititit BitstreamShareULLAR     (6) 
 
Note that once the access regulation has been implemented to an access type in a country, it 
will be maintained for all successive periods. Data on access regulation for these three types 
of access come from the Plaut Economic regulation index (Zenhäusern et al., 2007) and are 
updated as far as 2009 with information from the National Regulatory Agency reports and 
the European Commission’s Working Documents. 
 
Transposition of Community Law in the Information Society (Transit-1) 
 
Much of European regulation law takes the form of Directives that set out general rules and 
provisions, but which leave Member States the choice as to how to implement them. Primary 
responsibility for applying EU law lies with the national administrations in the Member 
States. From the Secretariat General of the European Commission we obtained data on the 
percentage of Directives implemented (by Member State and sector) showing the link 
between the provisions in EU Directives and national rules. The sector classification related 
to telecommunications is that of the “Information Society”. 
 
Our variable, Transit-1 captures the percentage of Directives associated with 
telecommunications that have been implemented in a country in each period. Since the 
access regulation is contained in EU Directives and the Member States must transpose these 
Directives to national laws in a pre-determined period of time, the Transit-1 variable, though 
less specific, can be seen as analogous to the access regulation variable. 
 
Regulatory Quality (RegQit-1) 
 
From a broader perspective, regulation extends beyond specific measures such as mandatory 
unbundling; hence, we attempt to validate our results by accounting for the quality of 
regulation. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit, and promote, private 
sector development. Our regulatory quality variable (RegQit-1) is a World Bank index built at 
the country level. It is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to higher levels of quality. 
 
Competition 
 
To capture the effects of competition at the retail level, we introduce two Herfindahl indexes 
(HHI) for each country and period in Eq. (1): one for intra-facility competition (HHI_intrait) 
within the DSL network (full ULL, shared-access, bitstream access and resale) and one for 
inter-facility competition (HHI_interit) between networks (DSL, cable, FTTx and wireless). 
A Herfindahl index measures the degree of concentration of the market, and is defined as the 
  
sum of the squares of a firm’s (or networks in the case of inter-facility) market shares. Data 
for the construction of these indexes are taken from the information provided by Point 
Topic’s Global Broadband Statistics. 
 
Previous studies of broadband penetration and diffusion have also controlled for intra-
facility and inter-facility competition effects. In the case of intra-facility competition, 
Bouckaert et al., 2010 find a negative effect, while Distaso et al. (2006) report an 
insignificant effect. In the case of inter-facility competition, while Bouckaert et al. (2010), 
Hoffler, (2007) and Distaso et al. (2006) find a positive effect, Gruber and Koutoumpis 
(2011) report a negative effect.  
 
Income 
 
We use per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDPpcit) as our income control variable.  
Previous studies in the literature on economic growth report a positive relationship between 
broadband penetration and economic growth (Koutroumpis, 2009 and Czenrich et al., 2011). 
Yet, broadband studies, such as Grajek and Roller (2010) and Distaso et al. (2006), which 
used income as a control variable, find no significant effect on either investment or 
penetration. To avoid possible problems of endogeneity from employing this variable, we 
use the lag of the GDPpc as an instrument in our instrumental variable estimations.
15
 The 
data on GDPpcit are from Eurostat. Table 3 contains the summary statistics of the dataset 
used in this study. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics. 
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 The endogeneity in this case derives from the possibility of spillovers generated by broadband networks that 
might result in externalities in other sectors of the economy, thus affecting the country’s GDP (see 
Koutroumpis, 2009). By adopting the instrumental variables approach applied in this study, our aim is to avoid 
problems of simultaneity bias and spurious correlation deriving from the possible endogeneity problems. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Invit 161 0.4927 0.6100 -1.2054 4.1540 
Inv_incit  159 0.4392 0.5313 -1.2175 3.5285 
Inv_entit 154 0.5805 0.8559 -2.0796 4.4397 
TF_Linit  216 0.6888 0.3787 0.0000 2.0500 
TF_Convit 216 0.3300 0.1974 0.0000 0.9025 
TF_Concit 216 1.2320 0.8256 0.0000 4.0424 
TFInc_Linit  216 0.1451 0.1337 0.0000 0.4000 
TFInc_Convit  216 0.0388 0.0522 0.0000 0.1600 
TFInc_Concit  216 0.3327 0.1859 0.0000 0.6325 
TFEnt_Linit  216 0.1775 0.2803 0.0000 1.2500 
TFEnt_Convit  216 0.0287 0.0633 0.0000 0.3175 
TFEnt_Concit  216 0.5519 0.7430 0.0000 3.1479 
ARit-1 189 2.1587 0.9710 0.0000 3.0000 
Transit-1 161 0.9755 0.0658 0.6842 1.0000 
RegQit-1 189 1.2372 0.3861 -0.1000 1.8900 
itHHI_inter  
itHHI_intra  
201 0.6421 0.1956 0.3202 1.0000 
201 0.8046 0.2216 0.2255 1.0000 
Ln itGDPpc  216 2.6293 0.8427 0.6620 4.1222 
  
4. Estimation and Results 
 
In order to analyse the impact of regulation and firm typology on infrastructure investment 
we perform two groups of estimations. The first group seeks to evaluate the effect of 
regulation and firm typology on investment (Eq. 1) using the general typology for all firms. 
We are particularly interested in testing whether different typologies of firm operating in a 
country influence the level of investment in that country. In the second group of estimations, 
to obtain a better understanding of the drivers of investment, we evaluate the investments of 
incumbents (Eq. 4) and entrants (Eq. 5) separately. In both sets of estimations we control for 
country and time fixed effects.  
 
4.1 Results I: all firms 
 
First, we estimate Eq. (1) by means of panel data techniques and report the results in Table 
4. To avoid possible endogeneity problems of the variable GDP per capita we make use of 
the instrumental variables (IV) method (results are presented in Table 5). Since our 
equations are exactly identified (the number of instruments equals the number of 
endogenous regressors), we are unable to test statistically for overidentification of all 
instruments (i.e. instrument exogeneity). However, we test for weak instruments with the F-
statistics from first-stage regressions following the rule of thumb (see Stock and Watson, 
2007). Our results show that weak identification is not a problem in our estimations, hence 
validating the relevance of our instruments. 
 
Overall, the results from the estimations of Eq. (1) support a positive relationship between 
firm typology and infrastructure investment. When controlling by country and time fixed 
effects, the variable capturing the type of firm operating in the market, constructed for both 
the linear and the concave case, is positive and significant (see Table 4 and Table 5). These 
results support the hypothesis of a firm’s internationalization and market knowledge acting 
as drivers of investment in the European broadband market.
16
 Moreover, our estimates 
indicate that when one firm enters into a country, the investment (increase in the stock of 
infrastructure) will be between 3.3% and 3.5% higher if the firm is also entrant in another 
country than if it is the first country in which the firm operates.
17
 Although firm level 
information would be needed to confirm these results, they seem to reflect the fact that firms 
invest internationally as part of an efficiency-seeking process or to exploit their scale 
economies. Furthermore, the relevance of international market knowledge for investment 
decisions seems to be important. This last point is evaluated in the following estimations in 
which we analyse the impact on investment according to the type of firms in a country, be 
they incumbents or entrants. 
 
As for the effects of regulation on investment, none of the three regulatory variables (access 
regulation intensity, regulatory quality and transposition to community law) are significant at 
an acceptable confidence level across all estimated specifications. Although these results are 
highly consistent, they must be interpreted with caution. Since the estimated effect is for 
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 Even thought none of the previous studies takes it into account, it seems reasonable to expect that firms’ 
investment decision in broadband might respond to the profitability that they may obtain when investing in a 
country. Thus, to control for profitability we have introduced as additional control variable the (sectoral) 
telecommunication gross operating surplus/turnover rate from Eurostat. Results for those estimations show no 
significant effect coming from country profitability, and all other variables remain largely unchanged. One 
explanation for these results could be the slightly change of the sector profitability rate in the countries covered 
in this study, being its effect mainly captured, then, by the country fixed effect.  
17
 From the semi-log linear function nature of Eq. (1) we used finite-difference methods to compute the 
marginal effect coming from a change on the typology of firms participating in the markets.  
  
total aggregate infrastructure investment (ignoring differences between incumbents and 
entrants), from an aggregate country point of view the implementation of some sectoral 
regulatory policies seems to have no effect on investment incentives.
18
 
 
Table 4: Panel data estimates with country and time fixed effect. Dependent variable Invit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Typology of Firm          
itLinTF _  
0.678* 
(0.388) 
0.654* 
(0.372) 
0.684* 
(0.379) 
      
itConvTF _  
   0.741 
(0.654) 
0.665 
(0.593) 
0.677 
(0.601) 
   
itConTF _  
      0.273 
(0.173) 
0.260 
(0.166) 
0.275 
(0.169) 
Regulation          
1itAR  
-0.065 
(0.080) 
  -0.070 
(0.087) 
  -0.060 
(0.081) 
  
1itRegQ   
 0.502 
(0.636) 
  0.540 
(0.661) 
  0.474 
(0.629) 
 
1itTrans  
  -0.713 
(0.553) 
  -0.651 
(0.597) 
  -0.710 
(0.556) 
Competition          
itHHI_inter  
2.009 
(1.331) 
2.096 
(1.350) 
2.167 
(1.334) 
1.844 
(1.450) 
1.939 
(1.470) 
1.989 
(1.451) 
1.874 
(1.403) 
1.959 
(1.424) 
2.020 
(1.403) 
itHHI_intra  
1.480** 
(0.702) 
1.455** 
(0.663) 
1.291** 
(0.588) 
1.076 
(0.640) 
1.062 
(0.626) 
0.889 
(0.550) 
1.580* 
(0.794) 
1.546** 
(0.747) 
1.394** 
(0.675) 
Income          
Ln ( itGDPpc ) 
-0.420 
(1.288) 
-0.574 
(1.288) 
-1.163 
(1.376) 
-0.427 
(1.360) 
-0.599 
(1.344) 
-1.184 
(1.430) 
-0.544 
(1.271) 
-0.684 
(1.281) 
-1.249 
(1.391) 
 
Constant -0.634 
(4.206) 
-1.040 
(4.307) 
2.024 
(4.508) 
0.023 
(4.454) 
-0.399 
(4.621) 
2.686 
(4.808) 
-0.531 
(4.305) 
-0.873 
(4.475) 
2.071 
(4.587) 
Observations 161 161 159 161 161 159 161 161 159 
R-squared 0.448 0.449 0.456 0.431 0.433 0.437 0.442 0.442 0.449 
Number of id 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by country 
 
Table 5: Panel data IV estimates with country and time fixed effect. Dependent variable Invit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Typology of Firm          
itLinTF _  
0.693* 
(0.365) 
0.655* 
(0.346) 
0.684* 
(0.353) 
      
itConvTF _  
   0.795 
(0.619) 
0.671 
(0.545) 
0.681 
(0.552) 
   
itConTF _  
      0.275* 
(0.166) 
0.260* 
(0.158) 
0.275* 
(0.160) 
Regulation          
1itAR  
-0.088 
(0.081) 
  -0.097 
(0.087) 
  -0.087 
(0.086) 
  
1itRegQ   
 0.510 
(0.578) 
  0.554 
(0.602) 
  0.493 
(0.573) 
 
1itTrans  
  -0.711 
(0.503) 
  -0.662 
(0.551) 
  -0.726 
(0.507) 
Competition          
itHHI_inter  
2.331 
(1.465) 
2.147 
(1.501) 
2.157 
(1.523) 
2.204 
(1.574) 
2.024 
(1.631) 
2.036 
(1.653) 
2.248 
(1.549) 
2.071 
(1.581) 
2.084 
(1.607) 
itHHI_intra  
1.448** 
(0.670) 
1.449** 
(0.645) 
1.292** 
(0.567) 
1.031* 
(0.603) 
1.050* 
(0.600) 
0.884* 
(0.518) 
1.535** 
(0.758) 
1.530** 
(0.727) 
1.387** 
(0.648) 
Income          
Ln ( itGDPpc ) 
0.696 
(1.595) 
-0.425 
(1.641) 
-1.191 
(2.006) 
0.837 
(1.631) 
-0.349 
(1.708) 
-1.028 
(2.077) 
0.756 
(1.662) 
-0.358 
(1.698) 
-1.040 
(2.104) 
Observations 161 161 159 161 161 159 161 161 159 
R-squared 0.445 0.449 0.456 0.427 0.432 0.437 0.437 0.442 0.449 
Number of id 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
F-statistic  29.70 90.51 43.48 40.38 125.00 56.33 26.62 82.25 39.43 
Note: see Table 4 
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 When we control by country fixed effect (without the time effect), the transposition of community law is 
significant and negative. Therefore, if we do not take into account the time component, the effect of regulation, 
if any, would be negative.    
  
Of the additional control variables, the intra-facility competition results are in line with those 
of Bouckaert et al. (2010). The variable is positive and significant in most cases, thus, the 
higher the competition within the DSL facility, the lower the investment in DSL. At the 
same time, the inter-facility competition variable is not significant at any acceptable 
confidence level across estimations. Thus, at the aggregate country level, changes in the 
distribution of the respective market shares enjoyed by DSL and alternative technologies 
have no significant effects on DSL infrastructure investment. The following estimations 
provide a more detailed examination of the effects derived from competition variables
19
. 
 
Finally, GDP per capita does not have a significant effect on investment across all estimated 
specifications. These results are in line with those of Grajek and Roller (2010) and Distaso et 
al. (2006), who also used income as a control variable and found no significant effect. 
 
4.2 Results II: entrant vs. incumbent firms 
 
Following our empirical strategy, we estimate Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) by means of panel data 
techniques (Table 6) and with IV (Table 7) separately by entrant and incumbent firms. To 
take into account the differences in their infrastructure investment behaviour, we separated 
incumbents from entrants. These more specific estimations allow us to obtain a better 
understanding of incumbents and entrants investment decisions. 
 
When investment drivers are analysed separately in this way, interesting patterns emerge. In 
the case of entrant firms, the variable capturing the typology of firm is generally positive 
and, more specifically, the convex version of the variable is significant across specification 
and estimation methods. By contrast, for incumbents this variable is not significant in any 
estimation. This last result points out that the expansion of incumbents to other countries 
does not seem to influence their infrastructure investment decisions in their original 
countries.
20
 
 
Our results on infrastructure investment by entrants indicate that when a firm enters into a 
country, the increase in investment will be between 1.9% and 2.0% higher if the firm 
entering is also entrant in another country instead of being the first country in which 
operates. Furthermore, when the firm entering is also incumbent in another country, the 
estimated increase in the infrastructure investment will be between 7.7% and 8.1% higher 
than if it was only entrant in another country. These results might reflect the fact that the 
entrants who invest more are those who have operations internationally and, probably, they 
are incumbents in other countries, which means they have a broader knowledge of 
telecommunication markets.  
 
In general, the non significant effects of regulation on investment are consistent with those 
found in previous section estimations. For incumbent firms, the results do not differ: 
regulation variables are not significant at an acceptable confidence level across all estimated 
specifications. However, in the case of entrants, our findings are not so clear cut: regulation 
seems to have no effect, and where there is some, it tends to be negative. While access 
regulation and regulatory quality variables are not significant in any of the cases, the 
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 We also consider that it can be a source of concern the possible endogeneity coming from the intra-facility 
competition. However, endogeneity tests (by difference-in-Sargan statistic) on this variable, confirm us that 
intra-facility competition variable can actually be treated as exogenous. 
20
 When we control by country fixed effects, in terms of firm typology, entrant firms are positive and 
significant, while incumbents are, in most cases, negative and significant. Therefore, if incumbent firms have 
an effect, it is negative.   
  
transposition to community law regulation variable is negative and significant. This negative 
effect on an entrant’s infrastructure investment might reflect the fact that the transposition of 
EU Directives would have facilitated the use of the incumbent infrastructure, and so the level 
of investment by entrants falls.   
 
The separate infrastructure investment estimation by incumbents and entrants also provides 
us with interesting results regarding market competition. In the case of entrants, the relation 
between intra-facility competition and investment parallels that of the aggregate estimations. 
The positive relation between intra-facility concentration and investment by entrants may be 
a result of the non-linearity in the relationship between competition and investment.
21
 
Entrants might gain in their market share by using incumbent infrastructure, and so increases 
in competition are not accompanied by investment (new lines) but rather by subscribers 
(connections) switching from incumbents to entrants.   
 
While intra-facility has no significant effect on the infrastructure investment of incumbents, 
the inter-facility competition, which gains significance in panel IV estimates, shows a 
positive effect. These results are consistent with Gruber and Koutoumpis (2011) who find a 
negative effect of inter-facility competition on broadband diffusion. Finally, as in previous 
estimations, GDP per capita does not have a significant effect on investment across all 
estimated specifications.  
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 We test for a non-monotonic relation between competition and investment by introducing an additional 
quadratic term (HHI-Intra
2
). Results for these estimations suggest a U-shaped relation between concentration 
and investment. 
  
Table 6: Panel data estimates with country and time fixed effect. Dependent variables Inv_entit and Inv_incit 
 Entrants Incumbents  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Typology of Firm                   
itLinTF _  
0.702 
(0.429) 
0.721 
(0.433) 
0.753 
(0.446) 
      -0.133 
(0.614) 
-0.155 
(0.571) 
-0.177 
(0.584) 
      
itConvTF _  
   2.492* 
(1.417) 
2.490* 
(1.440) 
2.567* 
(1.462) 
      0.125 
(1.468) 
0.050 
(1.323) 
0.079 
(1.373) 
   
itConTF _  
      0.238 
(0.190) 
0.254 
(0.188) 
0.267 
(0.199) 
      -0.198 
(0.500) 
-0.211 
(0.471) 
-0.233 
(0.480) 
Regulation                   
1itAR  
0.016 
(0.074) 
  0.022 
(0.075) 
 
  0.010 
(0.073) 
  -0.006 
(0.062) 
  -0.010 
(0.063) 
  -0.003 
(0.062) 
  
1itRegQ   
-0.801 
(0.811) 
 -0.750 
(0.810) 
  -0.827 
(0.822) 
  0.208 
(0.533) 
  0.203 
(0.529) 
  0.211 
(0.535) 
 
1itTrans  
  -2.539* 
(1.239) 
  -2.488* 
(1.224) 
  -2.541* 
(1.237) 
  -0.085 
(0.470) 
  -0.081 
(0.467) 
  -0.090 
(0.472) 
Competition                   
itHHI_inter  
1.678 
(1.970) 
1.611 
(1.994) 
1.745 
(1.932) 
1.868 
(1.987) 
1.794 
(2.027) 
1.937 
(1.974) 
1.429 
(2.003) 
1.358 
(2.021) 
1.466 
(1.955) 
2.298 
(1.511) 
2.313 
(1.522) 
2.314 
(1.504) 
2.282 
(1.507) 
2.304 
(1.515) 
2.304 
(1.500) 
2.308 
(1.513) 
2.321 
(1.522) 
2.321 
(1.505) 
itHHI_intra  
1.307* 
(0.669) 
1.306* 
(0.673) 
1.045 
(0.639) 
1.152 
(0.696) 
1.139 
(0.697) 
0.867 
(0.681) 
1.267* 
(0.681) 
1.282* 
(0.685) 
1.029 
(0.652) 
0.515 
(0.398) 
0.522 
(0.406) 
0.445 
(0.405) 
0.505 
(0.397) 
0.514 
(0.404) 
0.434 
(0.404) 
0.525 
(0.401) 
0.532 
(0.408) 
0.454 
(0.408) 
Income                   
Ln itGDPpc  
-1.049 
(1.720) 
-1.165 
(1.851) 
-0.082 
(1.658) 
-1.124 
(1.700) 
-1.211 
(1.844) 
-0.199 
(1.648) 
-1.029 
(1.754) 
-1.172 
(1.866) 
-0.016 
(1.673) 
-0.673 
(1.504) 
-0.651 
(1.449) 
-1.106 
(1.549) 
-0.639 
(1.502) 
-0.636 
(1.442) 
-1.085 
(1.540) 
-0.698 
(1.501) 
-0.665 
(1.449) 
-1.124 
(1.554) 
Constant 1.917 
(5.188) 
3.297 
(6.469) 
1505 
(5.265) 
2.071 
(5.145) 
3.427 
(6.455) 
1.868 
(5.259) 
1.541 
(5.388) 
3.042 
(6.571) 
1.284 
(5.452) 
0.773 
(4.850) 
0.405 
(5.091) 
2.132 
(5.080) 
0.681 
(4.832) 
0.363 
(5.067) 
2.058 
(5.042) 
0.875 
(4.883) 
0.482 
(5.126) 
2.232 
(5.129) 
Obs 154 154 152 154 154 152 154 154 152 159 159 157 159 159 157 159 159 157 
R-squared 0.419 0.423 0.435 0.419 0.422 0.434 0.414 0.419 0.431 0.399 0.400 0.402 0.399 0.400 0.402 0.400 0.401 0.403 
Number id 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: see Table 4 
 
  
Table 7: Panel data IV estimates with country and time fixed effect. Dependent variables Inv_entit and Inv_incit 
 Entrants Incumbents  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Typology of Firm                   
itLinTF _  
0.680 
(0.420) 
0.704* 
(0.421) 
0.740* 
(0.428) 
      -0.008 
(0.626) 
-0.112 
(0.560) 
-0.122 
(0.563) 
      
itConvTF _  
   2.495* 
(1.397) 
2.469* 
(1.411) 
2.604* 
(1.404) 
      0.378 
(1.463) 
0.114 
(1.277) 
0.101 
(1.299) 
   
itConTF _  
      0.223 
(0.183) 
0.246 
(0.180) 
0.252 
(0.190) 
      -0.087 
(0.514) 
-0.168 
(0.465) 
-0.179 
(0.468) 
Regulation                   
1itAR  
0.085 
(0.120) 
  0.086 
(0.117) 
 
  0.080 
(0.120) 
  -0.048 
(0.072) 
  -0.047 
(0.070) 
  -0.044 
(0.073) 
  
1itRegQ   
-0.919 
(0.843) 
 -0.859 
(0.838) 
  -0.950 
(0.857) 
  0.275 
(0.468) 
  0.263 
(0.464) 
  0.288 
(0.471) 
 
1itTrans  
  -2.236** 
(1.141) 
  -2.220* 
(1.137) 
  -2.222* 
(1.136) 
  -0.193 
(0.444) 
  -0.180 
(0.437) 
  -0.203 
(0.447) 
Competition                   
itHHI_inter  
1.038 
(2.171) 
1.106 
(2.152) 
1.362 
(2.080) 
1.280 
(2.175) 
1.338 
(2.178) 
1.605 
(2.099) 
0.784 
(2.201) 
0.835 
(2.173) 
1.071 
(2.105) 
2.815* 
(1.591) 
2.747* 
(1.605) 
2.734* 
(1.630) 
2.768* 
(1.584) 
2.702* 
(1.599) 
2.683* 
(1.626) 
2.842* 
(1.595) 
2.773* 
(1.608) 
2.765* 
(1.635) 
itHHI_intra  
1.491** 
(0.598) 
1.446** 
(0.598) 
1.183** 
(0.597) 
1.339** 
(0.618) 
1.273** 
(0.617) 
1.004 
(0.626) 
1.439** 
(0.607) 
1.425** 
(0.607) 
1.153* 
(0.612) 
0.438 
(0.356) 
0.459 
(0.364) 
0.395 
(0.358) 
0.435 
(0.355) 
0.453 
(0.364) 
0.390 
(0.359) 
0.443 
(0.357) 
0.465 
(0.365) 
0.400 
(0.359) 
Income                   
Ln itGDPpc  
-4.937 
(3.649) 
-3.804 
(3.504) 
-3.325 
(4.151) 
-4.748 
(3.660) 
-3.603 
(3.505) 
-3.101 
(4.148) 
-4.994 
(3.665) 
-3.942 
(3.503) 
-3.400 
(4.169) 
1.199 
(1.683) 
0.658 
(1.506) 
0.352 
(1.849) 
1.117 
(1.654) 
0.564 
(1.486) 
0.224 
(1.805) 
1.224 
(1.713) 
0.704 
(1.526) 
0.418 
(1.888) 
Obs 154 154 152 154 154 152 154 154 152 159 159 157 159 159 157 159 159 157 
R-squared 0.399 0.413 0.423 0.402 0.415 0.425 0.394 0.408 0.418 0.387 0.393 0.395 0.388 0.394 0.396 0.386 0.393 0.394 
Number id 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
F-statistic 27.26 101.3 44.53 26.49 98.85 42.77 28.15 106.5 47.44 46.20 131.1 55.05 45.59 138.70 58.23 45.14 127.70 53.56 
Note: see Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5. Conclusions  
 
In this study we have assessed the impact on investment behaviour in European broadband 
markets following major changes to the sector’s regulations (including the introduction of 
access regulation) in 2002. We have classified firms in the European telecommunication 
market according to the degree of internationalization of their operations and their market 
knowledge, and have tested the effect of this classification and market regulation on 
infrastructure investment in European DSL markets.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that regulation has not had a significant, direct impact on 
investment (and where an impact has been detected this has tended to be negative), and 
that at both levels of analysis (aggregate and separate) the firm’s internationalization and 
market knowledge are important drivers of infrastructure investment. A separate analysis 
of investment by incumbent and entrant firms shows that the positive effect on investment 
attributable to internationalization and market knowledge is higher in the case of entrants. 
 
The negative impact of competition on investment might indicate that the increase in 
competition is not accompanied by infrastructure investment, but rather by subscribers 
switching from incumbents to entrants. This, together with the possibility that DSL 
markets are currently at a stage in which the relationship between competition and 
investment is negative, raises questions as to the effectiveness of regulations to promote 
competition, and their possible long-term effects on DSL infrastructure.  
 
In short, our results would seem to indicate that, under the current regulatory framework, 
entrants that choose to invest more in infrastructure are those that have most international 
experience in the sector. As such, overall knowledge of the telecommunication sector 
plays an important role. In the case of incumbents, however, investing abroad does not 
seem to affect their investment levels in the country of origin. 
 
Although a number of valuable conclusions can be drawn from this study, certain 
shortcomings should be noted. First, given data availability, broadband infrastructure 
investment is not directly observable at either the firm or the country level. Second, 
detailed firm-level data would enable us to disentangle more clearly the respective roles 
being played by firms’ knowledge, on the one hand, and their internationalization, on the 
other. Thus, subsequent studies need to incorporate disaggregated data collection, which 
should facilitate a better understanding of how internationalization and market knowledge 
in European broadband markets are related to each other.  
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